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1.  Introduction 
The  study of what  makes  utterances difficult or easy  to  understand is one  of 
the central topics of research in  comprehension.  It is both  theoretically 
attractive and  useful in practice.  The  more  we  know  about  difficulties in 
understanding  the more  we  know  about  understanding.  And  the  better we  grasp 
typical  problems  of understanding  in certain types  of discourse  and  for cer-
tain recipients the better we  can  overcome  these  problems  and  the better we 
can  advise  people  whose  job it is to overcome  such  problems.  It is therefore 
not  surprising that comprehensibility  has  been  the object of much  reflection 
as  far  back  as the days  of classical rhetoric and  that it is a  center of 
lively interest in several present-day scientific disciplines,  ranging  from 
artificial intelligence and  educational  psychology  to linguistics.  The  multi-
disciplinary character of the field is no  doubt.inspiring,  but it does  not 4 
make  it easy to survey.  Different approaches  differ widely  as  to theoretical 
background,  empirical methodology,  and  criteria of quality of research  con-
ducted  in the respective traditions.  The  present  paper  aims  at contributing 
to the geography  of at least one  region of this field  by  presenting  an  over-
view  of what  comprehensibility  looks  like from  the  position of linguistic 
communication  analysis  - or dialogue  analysis,  the label does  not  really 
matter.  In  order to  bring  out  some  of the basic ideas of this approach  in 
full relief I  shall  now  and  then refer to  a  competitor  (or ally?)  in the 
field,  which  I  shall summarily  call "the cognitive approach".  I  shall begin 
by  mentioning  a  few  basic theoretical assumptions  of the dialogical approach. 
From  there I  shall go  on  to discuss  a  theory-based list of comprehension 
problems,  and  finally,  I  shall raise a  few  questions  as  to experimental 
design  in  comprehensibility research. 
2.  Basic  assumptions 
2.1  The  principle  of  comprehensibility:  a  dialogical  principle 
In  Grice's  "Logic  and  conversation"  we  find  the  following  remarks  on  the 
maxim  of perspicuity,  a  close relative of the  principle of comprehensibility: 
" ... under  the  category  of  MANNER  ... I  include the  supermaxim  - 'Be  perspi-
cuous'  - and  various  maxims  such  as: 
1.  'Avoid  obscurity of expression.' 
2.  'Avoid  ambiguity.' 
3.  'Be  brief  (avoid  unnecessary  prolixity).' 
4.  'Beorderly.' 
And  one  may  need  others"  (Grice  1967,  II, 8).1) 
Although  Grice  quickly  loses interest in this particular maxim  the  context of 
his  statement  may  be  useful  as  a  starting point in order to locate the topic 
of comprehensibility within  a  theory of linguistic action.  The  principle of 
comprehensibility is one  of the many  principles of rational interaction. It 
is therefore basically a  dialogical principle and  should  be  treated according-
ly.  I  should like to  pursue  tHis  idea  a  little further,  and  in so  doing, 
present  a  few  arguments  why  a  theory  of dialogue  ought to  be  one  of the essen-
tial ingredients of comprehensibility research. 
Comprehensibility is not just a  quality of texts,  as  readability research 
generally  assumed,  but  a  quality of contributions to communicative  trans-
actions.  A certain text may  be  easily comprehensible  for  one  recipient but 
not  for the other,  therefore comprehensibility is largely a  matter of "reci-5 
pient design",  i.e.  the speaker or writer will base  his decisions  on  how  to 
say  what  he  wants  to  say  on  his assumptions  as to the  competence,  the  assump-
tions,  and  the  knowledge  of the  intended recipient.2)  Inversely,  in under-
standing  or interpreting the speaker's utterances the recipient will have  to 
go  on  his or her  assumptions  as  to the speaker's competence  and  assumptions. 
So  what  emerges  is that in order to explain  a  phenomenon  like "recipient 
design"  we  need  concepts of a  theory of dialogue,  e.g.  shared  and  non-shared 
knowledge,  mutual  assumptions,  strategy  (in  a  game-theoretical sense),  just 
to  name  a  few.  It is furthermore  important to  see that comprehensibility is 
not  the responsibility of the  speaker or writer alone  but  something  that 
depends  on  the contributions of the  hearer or reader as  weIl. 
Seen  from  a  practical point of view  problems  of comprehension  are most 
urgent  in types  of communication  that deviate  from  the face-to-face  prototype 
of dialogue,  e.g.  written instructions,  TV  news  broadcasts,  lectures etc. 
This  is due  to the fact that these forms  of communication  show  diverse limi-
tat  ions  in the range  of resources  for  locating  and  remedying  comprehension 
troubles.  (There  are  of course also  certain advantages,  like the  chance  to 
re-read  a  difficult written  passage.)  But  even  for these  seemingly  non-dia-
logical forms  the dialogical prototype is a  fundamental  object of comparison. 
This  is quite  obvious  in thosecases where  an  author anticipates  questions 
and  objections from  an  imaginary  audience  and  incorporates the relevant 
answers  and  refutations in his text.  In some  cases  such  practical measures 
actually consist in the adoption  of dialogical  procedures,  e.g.  the  use  of 
forms  of dialogue  in certain types of broadcast or of simulated  dialogue in 
introductory  passages  of computer  manuals  or expert  help  systems  (cf.  Krenn 
1989,  Muckenhaupt  1986,  Suchman  1987). 
2.2 Some  complicating  factors  in  the  application  of  the  principle 
The  application of the principle of comprehensibility is a  fine-grained  and 
highly  context-bound  matter.  In this respect it resembles  the application of 
the  principle of relevance which  is notoriously  open-textured.  In order to 
judge the  proper status of the principle under  discussion and  in order to 
properly judge its modes  of application one  has  to consider at least the 
following  factors: 
(i)  different types of discourse 
For  some  types  of discourse  comprehensibility is a  very  high-level principle, 
e.g.  in  many  types of instruction,  where  comprehensibility is a  necessary 
condition of success.  For  other types  of discourse it does  not  seem  to  be  a 6 
fundamental  principle at all,  e.g.  for the  performance  of some  religious 
rituals or for the  producing  and  reading  of hermetic  poetry.  Even  within  an 
individual discourse the degree  and  mode  of application  may  vary.  Further-
more,  the  actual  problems  and  possible measures  of improvement  of comprehen-
sibility may  vary  with  the type  of discourse  (e.g.  career counselling  vs. 
television  news  broadcasts). 
(ii)  different  (kinds  of)  recipients 
Small  children,  amnestie  aphasics  and  first year students raise completely 
different problems  of comprehension  - at least superficially -,  which  one  has 
to adapt  to if one  wants  to reach  certain communicative  aims.  There  are  also 
those  cases  where  we  deliberately  violate the principle in order to  exclude 
someone  from  parts of a  dialogue,  e.g.  when  tal  king  about  delicate topics  "in 
front  of the children".  A special cluster of difficulties arises in situations 
where  a  speaker  or writer addresses  an  inhomogeneous  audience,  as  in the ca se 
of package  inserts for medicine  where  often the  same  text addresses  doctors 
and  patients.  Such  compromise  texts tend to  be  rather unsatisfactory as  they 
are too difficult for  laymen  to  understand  and  too  uninformative  for  doctors. 
(iii)  conflicts and  connections  with  other principles 
Depending  on  the type  of discourse  involved  the  principle of comprehensibility 
may  conflict with  the  principle of brevity,  the  principle of complete  informa-
tion,  the  principle of precision,  and  others.  The  status of the  principle in 
relation to a  certain type of discourse  also depends  on  the reasons  one  can 
give  for  following  the principle.  The  analysis of such  reasons  often leads to 
principles of a  different  kind,  like principles of efficiency  (in  many  types 
of information transmission),  basic democratic  principles  (as  in legal con-
texts or in the  case  of political information in the media),  principles of 
politeness,  and  others. 
(iv)  the current state of the discourse 
In  face-to-face  communications  problems  of comprehension  are  usually dealt 
with  in  an  ad-hoc  fashion  "as  you  go  along".  In doing  so  the participants can 
rely  on  their mutual  knowledge  which  in part consists of their knowledge  of 
the recent history of the discourse.3)  Knowledge  of the dynamics  of the dis-
course  and  its current state is an  important resource  for the location and 
repair of comprehension  troubles.  The  problems  involved  are  of a  highly  con-
text-bound  nature  and  seem  to defy  general  prophylactic solutions in terms 
of rules and  algorithms. 7 
2.3  Dialogical  approach  and  cognitive  approach 
In order to  show  some  areas of theoretical tension in the field  I  shall give 
a  very  rough  description of two  competing  or,  as  I  already mentioned,  possibly 
complementary  approaches  to  problems  of comprehensibility.  The  two  approaches 
I  should  like to  compare  could  be  called the dialogicalor interactional 
approach  and  the cognitive approach.  Of  course,  these two  approaches  are to a 
certain extent artifacts of my  classification.  I  shall not  comment  on 
approaches  with  a  mainly  practical interest which  do  not  seem  to have  any 
particular theoretical affiliation,  like the so-ca  lIed Hamburg  conception, 
which  is very  popular in Germany,  and  the majority  of readability formulas.4) 
The  dialogical approach  is mainly  represented  by  authors  with  a  background 
from  linguistics and/or discourse analysis  (cf.  Heringer 1979,  Muckenhaupt 
1981,  Hoffmann  1984,  Biere 1989).  Some  authors,  like van  Dijk,  try to get the 
best of both  worlds  (cf.  van  Dijk/Kintsch 1983).  As  their theoretical  creed 
interactionalist share  some  version of a  theory  of human  action,  more  specifi-
cally a  theory of linguistic action.  Their method  is to  a  certain extent 
phenomenoiogical,  i.e.  one  of their basic activities consists in the close 
description of utterance forms  and  contexts of use  in which  utterances te  nd 
to produce  comprehension  difficulties.  At  the  same  time  they describe the 
interactive procedures that can  be  used  to diagnose  and  clarify comprehension 
problems  and  the means  normally  used  in  securing  comprehension.  They  explain 
comprehension  difficulties in terms  of the linguistic forms  used,  in terms  of 
coherence  relations  (local sequencing,  the  dynamics  of topic shift etc.)  and 
the latitude involved  in interpreting such  relations,  and  in terms  of knowledge 
constellations and  the resources available for the solution of coordination 
problems. 
The  cognitive approach  on  the other hand  is mainly  represented  by  authors 
with  a  background  from  cognitive psychology  or cognitive science in general. 
Of  course  there is no  such  thing  as  a  unified  position in this approach  as 
weIl.  The  basic tenet of this approach  is the assumption that understanding 
is an  interna  1  procedure  by  which  an  input of linguistic utterances is pro-
cessed to yield  an  output of knowledge  which  is represented  in the mind.  The 
main  activity of cognitivists consists in modelling  aspects of this process 
and  the types of representations involved.  Explanations of comprehension 
problems  are given  in terms  of processing  load and  memory  capacity.  Difficul-
ties of comprehension  show  in an  increase of  processing time  or a  decrease 
in quantity or accuracy  of recall. It is by  looking  at the mind  of the indi-
vidual that one  can  solve the  puzzles of comprehension. 8 
Now  if one  feels that comprehensibility  should  be  the subject of inter-
disciplinary studies one  should try and  find  out if the  cooperation  could  be 
put  on  a  proper  footing.  This  means  submitting the respective  conceptual 
frameworks  to  a  close  comparative  scrutiny.  In our  case the  comparison  reveals 
quite  a  number  of basic  concepts where  we  might  suspect  divergence  or  even 
st~aight-on incompatibility.  Among  the major  candidates  are  concepts  like 
understanding,  meaning,  information,  knowledge,  strategy,  and  plan.5)  It is 
for  example  not  obvious  how  understanding  as  an  achievement  concept  (follo-
wing  Ryle's  analysis)  can  be  reconciled with  the cognitivists'  process  model 
of understanding.  If I  say  Now  I  understand what  you  mean  I  do  not  make  a 
statement  concerning  internal  processes  but  I  rather describe amental state. 
There  is indeed  a  process  concept  which  is related to the  concept  of under-
standing,  namely  interpreting.  Interpreting is an  activity which  by  steps of 
reasoning  may  lead  from  a  first unsatisfactory  understanding to  a  second, 
more  adequate  understanding.  It is revealing that cognitivists rarely diffe-
rentiate between  understanding  and  interpreting.  It is also quite difficult 
to  determine  the relationship  between  the  concept  of strategy used  in  game 
theory  and  the  concept  of strategy in  cognitive  psychology.  It is rather 
instructive to  see what  a  hard  time  van  Dijk  and  Kintsch  are  having  in ex-
plaining the  compatibility of the  two  concepts  (van  Dijk/Kintsch 1983,  64ff.). 
On  a  lower  and  more  technical level there are  concepts like  proposition. 
What  is called a  proposition  by  some  cognitive  psychologists  looks  very 
strange to someone  trained in analytical philosophy  or linguistics  (cf. 
Kintsch/Vipond  1979).  These  rathertoo brief remarks  indicate that there seems 
to  be  quite  a  bit of hard  work  to  do  before the two  approaches  may  work  in 
conceptual  harmony.  On  the  other hand  there are  promising  signs of an  increase 
in shared  knowledge  across the  boundaries  of the two  approaches.  The  follo-
wing  passage  by  Marslen-Wilson  and  Tyler,  two  well-known  representatives of 
the  cognitive  approach,  could  be  taken  as  such  a  sign: 
"In fact,  we  might  speculate,  it is the  cooperativeness of speakers  and 
listeners that goes  the furthest  in explaining  how  the  speech  process 
can  be  so  rapid,  and  how,  in  particular,  inputs  can  be  projected with 
such  immediacy  onto  the  liste~er's discourse model:  It is because 
speakers  prepare their utterances so  that they  cohere  with  wh at has  been 
said  before,  and  because  listeners run  their processing  systems  on  this 
assumption.  This  is wh at gives  language  processing its seemingly  ballistic 
property  - that the  speaker  constructs  a  communicative  packet that is 
already  configured  to  map  onto the receptive  configuration of the 9 
listener"  (Marslen-Wilson/Tyler 1987,  61). 
Discount  the  computer  metaphors  and  you  get  one  of the  basic  assumptions  of the 
dialogical approach. 
3.  Aspects  of  understanding  and  types  of  comprehension  problems 
The  basic unit of understanding  and  misunderstanding,  for  a  theory  of lingui-
stic action,  is the linguistic act.  A linguistic act is the  use  of a  lingui-
stic expression in a  certain context  and  with  a  particular intention.  I  shall 
for the moment  assume  that problems  connected  with the  concept  of linguistic 
act  (or speech  act) ,  speech  act assignment,  non-sentential  utterance forms 
and  similar questions  can  be  solved.  One  of the  lessons that can  be  derived 
from  Wittgensteins  use  of the  concept  of Zusammenhang,  which  is a  close rela-
tive of the  concept of language  game,  is that it is the  network  of connecti-
ons  of a  particular utterance that accounts  for its function.6)  As  a  corollary 
for the theory  of understanding  one  could  formulate the  slogan:  "To  understand 
an  utterance is to see its connections".  For  this slogan to  have  any  force 
one  has  to speIl out  what  are the relevant connections  (contexts,  relations) 
which  one  has  to see inorderto understand.  One  would  expect to find  these 
connections  among  the  basic principles of organization of discourse,  especial-
ly dialogical  discourse.  I  shall therefore list a  number~of connections that 
have  received theoretical attention mainly  during  the last fifteen  or twenty 
years  and  examine  their relevance  for  comprehensibility.  The  guiding  idea is 
that each  of these connections represents  an  aspect  of understanding  and  can 
therefore  be  taken  as  a  factor which  may  play  a  role in comprehension  pro-
blems.  It will  probably  surprise nobody  that in actual  ca ses these factors 
interact,  either cancelling out one  another or producing  a  cumulative  effect. 
In  what  follows  I  shall deal  only  marginally  with  two  topics that have 
always  figured  prominently  in research  on  comprehensibility:  vocabulary  and 
syntax.  This  is merely  a  matter of emphasis  in the  present  paper.7)  As  far 
as syntax is concerned  I  should at least like to mention  one  interesting 
trend in studies on  parsing.  There  is a  growing  body  of research that seems 
to  show  that syntactic parsing re  lies to a  considerable extent on  contextual 
knowledge  (cf.  Crain/Steedman  (1985)  on  the resolution of syntactic ambiguity). 
This  is just one  example  of the interaction of factors.  I  shall also  not deal 
with  questions  of pronunciation,  intonation,  speed  of utterance,  or,  for that 
matter:  lay-out in written texts,  which  are of course  important factors  of 
comprehensibility and  which  should  be  dealt with  in a  comprehensive  treatment 
of the subject. 10 
3.1  Level-generation  and  background  of  assumptions 
The  first type of connection  I  shall consider has  been  well-known  since the 
early days  of speech-act theory,  although it has  not  played  a  prominent  role 
in Searle's  ~ersion of a  theory of speech  acts.  By  uttering the  same  expres-
sion  against different backgrounds  of assumptions  one  can  perform  different 
speech  acts,  e.g.  by  uttering  You  started  smoking  aga in one  can  simply  make 
a  statement or,  by  making  this statement,  one  can  intend  a  more  specific act 
like either an  utterance of surprise or disapproval  or both.  This  kind  of 
relation between  acts which  was  termed  "level-generation"  by  Goldman  (1970, 
20)  is an  essential aspect of understanding.  It is this relation that accounts 
for well-known  facts  like the. following:  People will understand  the same 
utterance or sequence  of utterances differently,  they will sometimes  misunder-
stand  utterances to a  certain degree  and  they will sometimes  reach a  different 
depth  of understanding.  The  latter is a  very  interesting  problem  in teaching, 
for  example. 
To  some  psychologists this complex  connection  between  different under-
standings of the  same  utterance seems  to  be  nothing  but  an  unwelcome  compli-
cation for  experimental  design  which  is at the most  grudgingly  acknowledged 
but  more  readily ignored or explained away.  From  the  point of view  of dialogue 
analysis,  however,  this connection is both  a  fundamental  resource  and  risk in 
communication,  which  shows  up  in the  high  proportion of preparation and  clari-
fication  sequences  in everyday  conversations.  The  implications for  comprehen-
sion research  are obvious:  The  researcher should  not  just ask:  "Did  the  sub-
ject und erstand the text?",  meaning  "Did  she  understand it the  same  way  as  the 
experimenter?",  but rather one  should  ask:  "How  did  she  understand the text 
and  what  are the clues for this particular understanding?".  Apart  from  a 
certain lack  of hermeneutical  imagination there is another characteristic of 
much  psychological work  that is related to this theoretical point.  Researchers 
tend to  neglect the  illocutionary aspect  of utterances  as  opposed  to the 
propositional aspect.B)  But  very  often a  comprehension  problem  resides in the 
very  difficulty of finding  out whether  a  given  utterance is to  be  taken  as 
descriptive or as  directive.  This  problem  is, for  example,  quite frequent 
for  users  of instruction manuals  (cf.  Schäflein-Armbruster  (forthcoming)). 
3.2  Constellations  of  knowledge  and  their  development 
In  part this se  co nd  item is an  extension of the first. It is a  truism of 
philosophical communication  theory that assumptions  as  to the  knowledge  and 
assumptions  of the participants form  one  of the cornerstones of communication. 11 
As  early as  1964  Strawson  introduced the  concept  of identifying  knowledge 
into the theory  of reference.  He  also  introduced  two  platitudes,  as  he  called 
it, the  principle of the  presumption  of ignorance  and  the  complementary  prin-
ciple of the presumption  of knowledge.  80th  principles are normally  relied 
upon  in informative  discourse.  In fact  people  commonly  assume  a  large  commu-
nity of identifying  knowledge  and  other relevant  knowledge.  The  structure of 
such  a  constellation of  knowledge  has  been  spelt out  by  Schiffer  (1972)  and 
others,  yielding the  concept  of mutual  knowledge,  an  important if not  undis-
puted  concept  of dialogue  analysis.  In the  course  of a  dialogue  a  network  of 
mutual  knowledge  and  assumptions  emerges,  whether  the  participants aim  at it 
or not.  There  are several mechanisms  by  which  mutual  assumptions  arise.  One 
of them  comes  into play  when  assumptions  are presupposed  for reference or 
for  metaphorical  speech  which  have  neither been  explicitly introduced  nor 
can  be  assumed  to  be  general  knowledge.  In this case  the  hearer might  operate 
on  the  principle of accomodation,  as  Lewis  (1979)  ca lIed it. She  will  assume 
that the  speaker takes  certain facts  as  given  and  will  herself take this for 
granted  unless there is evidence  to the contrary.  In  other cases,  as for 
example  in teaching  communications,  the participants may  actually  put  a  lot 
of effort into the systematic  building-up of knowledge.  Seen  from  the  angle 
of comprehensibility the participants will have  to answet  questions like the 
following:  Which  is the relevant  knowledge  for  an  adequate  understanding  of 
individual instructional utterances?  How  does  one  know  which  is the relevant 
knowledge?  (This  concerns  both  teacher and  pupil.)  How  can  this  knowledge  be 
made  available to the listener or reader?  How  does  one  find  out what  amount 
of  knowledge  listeners or readers  already  have  available?  How  can  one  secure 
or activate this  knowledge  at relevant points  in discourse?  To  what  extent 
can  the  speaker or writer rely  on  inferences his  partner in communication 
will draw?  These  questions  point to  a  number  of problems  of coordination 
which  have  to be  solved if communication  is to  be  successful.  In face-to-face 
dialogue there are,  as  we  already mentioned,  plenty of interactive resources 
for the  solution of these coordination  problems,  whereas  in written discourse 
knowledge  management  be comes  a  major  difficulty.  One  important aspect  of this 
difficulty is the question of adequate  sequencing  to which  I  shall revert 
in 3.4. 
The  fundamental  importance  of  knowledge  management  in communication  is 
appreciated equally weIl  by  representatives of cognitive science  and  communi-
cation analysis.  No  doubt  this is the major  point of convergence  between  the 
different approaches  in this field.  Cognitive  psychologists generally  assume 12 
that the  amount  of non-stereotypical and  not  explicitly provided  knowledge 
and  the  number  of inferences  needed  for  processing  account  for  comprehension 
difficulties. If one  does  not accept the general  processing model  one  will 
still come  to similar conclusions  by  a  different route of argument.  As  soon 
as  normal  first-pass  understanding  does  not  work  on  account  of  knowledge 
gaps  the  hearer or reader  may  have  to turn to  hermeneutic  operations,  and  it 
is this  predicament  which  is a  symptom  of comprehension  problems. 
Cognitive  science  has  so  far  produced  a  number  of interesting concepts 
like schema,  frame  and  script which  are  useful first approximations  to the 
kind  of general  knowledge  a  speaker  can  safely assume  his  hearer to  possess 
if she  is a  member  of a  certain culture or society.  These  concepts  are 
however  rat  her  rigid in view  of the  dynamics  of  knowledge  accumulation  and 
knowledge  utilisation in  communication.  The  analysis of the heuristic ad-hoc 
procedures  which  hearers  and  readers  employ  to cope  with  uncertainties in 
the attribution of  knowledge  and  assumptions  is still in its infancy. 
3.3  Local  sequencing 
Local  coherence  has  received  a  fair share of attention in re  cent studies on 
comprehension,  with  particular emphasis  on  problems  of referential coherence 
(cf.  Bower/Cirilo 1985,  86ff.).  It is of course true that reference with its 
high  degree  of reliance on  mutual  knowledge  looms  large  among  comprehension 
problems.  Furthermore,  problems  of reference are  comparatively  easily detec-
ted.  And  it is also true  that there are special difficulties connected 
with  cross-reference.  But  there is more  to local  coherence  than  cross-refe-
rence.  Utterance  U 1  may  be  used  to make  astatement,  and  the  following 
utterance  U 2 may  be  used  to  exemplify,  prove,  explain or otherwise support 
the statement.  This  sequence  may  presuppose  various relations between  the 
pro positions expressed  (entailment etc.).  In other cases the first utterance 
may  be  intended  to. prepare the  second  by  providing  a  certain focus  or a  rele-
vant  item  of knowledge  etc.  As  these types  of coherence  relations have  been 
dealt with  in work  on  text linguistics and  conversation  analysis  I  shall not 
enlarge  on  this point  (cf.  Fritz 1982).  Suffice it to  say that the  assignment 
of a  sequence of utterances to an  appropriate  sequence  pattern is an  essen-
tial aspect of understanding  and  therefore also  a  frequent  locus  of compre-
hension  problems.  It is for  example  possible that a  change  of interpretation 
of one  utterance in a  sequence  necessitates  a  reassessment of the meaning  of 
the  complete  sequential neighbourhood.  These  subtle relations are often  not 
sufficiently appreciated.  This  be comes  apparent when  researchers  use scrambled  texts for  comprehension  experiments  (e.g.  Thorndyke  1977). 
The  scrambling  usually  does  much  more  than just change  the  ordering of 
propositions. 
3.4  Global  sequencing  and  alternative  sequencing  strategies 
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For  all types of extended  discourse it is possible to differentiate characte-
ristic substructures which  often allow fairly intricate alternatives of 
sequencing.  In problem-solving  and  planning  dialogues,  for  example,  one  can 
present  a  suggestion,  describe its ramifications,  anticipate objections, 
compare  it to alternative suggestions,  and  evaluate it.  To  a  certain degree 
these  segments  of discourse  are sequentially fixed.  You  cannot  normally 
evaluate  a  suggestion that has  not  been  made.  But  you  can  position descrip-
tive elements  at different points in the discourse.  Therefore,  as  a  speaker 
or writer you  are  faced  with  strategic choices  of placement  and  as  a  hearer 
or reader  you  have  to see the  point of the chosen  placement. 
As  far as  research in comprehension  is concerned  there is mainly  one  type 
of discourse  where  global  sequences  have  been  extensively  investigated, 
namely  narrative discourse.  There  is also  some  work  on  expository texts, 
mainly  from  an  educational  point of view  (cf.  Schnotz  1984).  The  construction 
of so-called story grammars  sparked  off quite  a  lively discussion  on  global 
structures  and  their relation to  understanding.  Generally  speaking,  these 
studies,  especially the early ones  (cf.  Rumelhart  1975),  te  nd  to underrate 
the variability of placement  of typical  story segments.  As  a  consequence 
story grammarians  underrate the flexibility of hearers and  readers in dealing 
with  sequencing  alternatives,  but  also the type  of comprehension  problem  that 
lies in this variability. 
I  should like to illustrate the difficulties involved  by  describing in-
formally  some  global  sequencing  alternatives and  their consequences  for  a 
type  of discourse,  that has  been  investigated  by  linguists,  among  others, 
namely  teaching  how  to playagame  (cf.  Muckenhaupt  1976).  In teaching  how 
to  play  a  game  like chess  you  can  first intro  du ce  and  describe the  complete 
inventory of game  objects,  i.e.  the  chessboard  and  the pieces,  and  then  go 
on  to  describe all the individual  kinds  of moves  one  can  make  with the diffe-
rent types  of chessmen.  You  can  then attend to matters  of strategy and  so  on. 
The  advantage  of this  kind  of "systematic"  introduction wiil  be  that the 
learner receives  a  general  idea of what  the game  is about  at an  early  stage 
of his tuition. On  the other hand  it is quite likely that our  learner will 
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make  his first move.  If you  suspect this possibility  you  might  prefer  pro-
viding  information  as  you  go  along  on  the principle of "need  to  know".  You 
might  start by  introducing  a  pawn,  describing its range  of movement  and 
giving the learner a  short exercise in following  these  simple  rules.  You  then 
continue  by  introducing  a  knight  in the  same  fashion  etc.  For  some  learners 
this method  of spacing-out information will increase the  comprehensibility 
of individual explanations,  as the relevance of each  bit of information 
becomes  immediately  recognizable.  However,  some  learners might  resent this 
kind  of spoon-feeding.  There  are of course  also particularly confusing  mixed 
strategies where  the  teacher jumps  back  and  forth  between  the introduction 
of game  pieces,  strategic hints,  rule formulations  and  reminiscences of 
interesting games. 
Now  obviously this question of strategic placement  of certain types  of 
linguistic act applies  not  only  to the teaching  of games  but  also to other 
kinds  of instruction and  to  many  other types  of discourse. 
In  concluding this point  I  should  like to mention  the  question of ex-
plicitness to which  I  shall revert in section 3.6.  In the  present context the 
question takes the  following  form:  Wh at is the relative merit  of just using 
an  optimal  placement  strategy  - if there is one  - and  of actually telling the 
hearer/reader which  strategy  you  are  using? 
3.5  Structure  and  development  of  topics 
As  aglobaI principle of organization of discourse topical sequencing  is 
complementary  to functional  (or illocutionary)  sequencing  which  I  dealt with 
in the last two  sections.  It is an  important  part of comprehension  to  keep 
up  with the  development  of the topic or topics.  As  with  illocutionary force 
there is a  fairly  complex  relationship  between  the  actual  utterances  and 
what  they  are about.  A passage  of discourse  may  at first sight be  about 
different means  of transport,  like cars,  lorries,  airplanes,  buses,  trains 
and  bycicles.  On  closer inspection it really turns out to  be  about the topic 
of ecology.  One  could  describe this as  a  kind  of topical  "level-generation": 
By  talking  about  cars and  bycicles etc.  in a  certain way  one  can  talk about 
ecology.  So  at this point we  again find  the systematic  problem  of depth  of 
understanding  as  weIl  as the  problem  of differing  understandings  concerning 
the  current topic.  If a  listen  er or reader does  not realize the superordinate 
topic of a  passage  of discourse  he  may  weIl  find it difficult to see  connec-
tions  between  parts of this  passage.  He  may  interpret the topical development 
as  a  ca se of topic change  instead of taking it as  a  change  of aspect within 15 
the  same  topic.  In other words:  If one  wants  to  keep  one's listener or reader 
up  to date as  to the topical state of the  discourse it might  be  useful to 
indicate the structure of the topical network  as the speaker or writer sees 
it. 
These  assumptions  will  probably  not  be  disputed  by  anyone,  but  in main-
stream  comprehensibility research these  questions  are still underrepresented. 
There  is indeed  an  increasing  number  of studies on  topic structure,  topic 
continuity,  and  topic shift  (e.g.  Fletcher 1984,  Garrod/Sanford  1983,  Lorch 
et al.  1985)  but  much  of the rich  knowledge  on  topic introduction,  topic 
change,  topic shading  etc.  which  has  been  accumulated  in conversation  analy-
sis and  text linguistics  (e.g.  Schegloff/Sacks  1973,  8ublitz 1988)  still 
awaits  application in empirical research  on  comprehensibility. 
3.6  Principles  of  communication 
As  with  other aspects of communication,  like functional  sequencing  and  topic 
management,  principles of communication  may  become  relevant at two  different 
levels.  At  the basic level principles may  be  followed  in order to  safeguard 
the  attainment of communicative  aims.  At  the  secondary  level they  may  actually 
be  mentioned  in  order to secure mutual  knowledge  of what  is going  on.  For 
example,  in giving  an  introductory lecture course to  beginners  a  lecturer 
might  announce  that the first lecture will give a  general  idea of the topic 
in everyday  language,  whereas  the  second  lecture will increase the degree  of 
detail and  terminological  precision.  This  announcement  will  help the student 
to understand what  is going  on  in the transition from  lecture one  to lecture 
two  and  to appreciate the respective style of presentation.  Knowing  the  prin-
ciples somebody  is acting  on  supplies a  basis for  recognizing his  intentions 
and,  if necessary,  for figuring  out  what  these intentions  could  be  if they 
are  not  obvious. 
I  shall in this paper  not  tackle the principle of relevance which  is of 
course all-pervasive in matters of understanding  (cf.  Dascal  1979,  Sperber/ 
Wilson  1986).  In  fact,  the types of connections  I  have  mentioned  so  far  could 
be  considered  as  a  partial explication of the  concept  of communicative  rele-
vance.  I  shall however  present a  few  reflections on  another  principle which 
is also  prominent  in the field of comprehension,  namely  the principle of 
explicitness.  Explicitness is generally  assumed  to  be  the  cure for  many  mala-
dies of comprehension.  But  this  has  to  be  taken  with  a  grain of salto 
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therefore  assume  that the  nature  of their speech  acts,  speech  act sequences, 
topical  connections etc.  will  be  apparent  without  further  comment.  It is 
important to see that this is not  a  weakness  but  a  fundamental  resource  of 
efficient discourse.  Now  if one  aims  at a  high  level of complexity  and  depth 
of understanding  one  might  seek  extra  measures  to make  sure  one  gets across 
what  one  wants  to  be  understood.  One  of these measures  is the increase of 
explicitness.  One  type  of application of the principle of explicitness is 
the  use  of reflexive moves,  i.e.  naming  the function  or topic of a  passage, 
announcing  a  change  of topic,  summarizing  the gist of what  one  intended to 
say  etc.  These  measures  can  be  taken  in  advance,  afterwards or even  simul-
taneously  - if one  can  use  pictures,  graphic  displays  or marginalia.  All 
this is uncontroversial  and  in good  consonance  with results from  cognitive 
psychology,  e.g.  the  concept of "advance  organizer"  (cf.  Ausubel  1960). 
There  is however  a  limit to explicitness.  Total explicitness is not  possible 
on  principle as  there is no  utterance which  does  not  rely  on  a  background 
of assumptions.  And  a  very  high  degree  of explicitness conflicts with  the 
principles of brevity,  simplicity  and  continuity of topic.  So,  in fact, 
explicitness  may  be  self-defeating.  The  secret is to  provide  explicitness 
in the right places.  In some  cases it is possible to give  general  guidelines 
how  to apply  the  principle,  as  in the  case of instructional texts where  one 
can  follow  a  principle of decreasing explicitness.  For  any  new  topic,  intro-
ductory  passages  are to  be  highest in explicitness.  If the  presentation of 
knowledge  is well-controlled,  explicitness can  be  systematically reduced  in 
later passages.  But  generally  speaking,  to decide which  are the salient 
points which  have  to  be  made  explicit is a  matter of judgement  and  cannot 
be  predetermined  in  a  completely  mechanical  fashion.  It needs  the  kind  of 
expertise that is gained  by  experience with  specific types  of discourse  and 
specific recipients.  Of  course  we  assume  that it is theoretically enlightened 
experience which  will  be  most  explicit in its judgment. 
4.  Dialogical  comprehensibility  experiments 
4.1  Theory  and  methodology 
Empirical  research  on  comprehensibility  serves  a  variety of  purposes  from 
justifying theories of comprehension  to testing  and  improving  the  usability 
of particular texts for  particular users.  Of  the  many  relevant questions 
that could  be  dealt with at the  present stage of research there is one  that 
seems  particularly attractive,  as it points  both  ways,  towards the construc-
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the  quest  ion  of a  typology  of comprehension  problems  - or a  family  of typo-
logies  - that is/are both  theoretically sound  and  practically relevant.  One 
would  expect that it should  be  possible to give  a  medium-sized list of basic 
problem-types  which  could  be  traced  back  to  basic aspects of the  understan-
ding  of communicative  acts.  That  is what  I  provisionally attempted  in the 
preceding  sections.  It is however  a  remarkable  experience that types  of 
problems  tend  to proliferate as  soon  as  one  closely analyses  particular types 
of discourse.  A case  in  point is the  plethora  of new  problems  that show  up 
if one  starts to analyse the  uses  of pictures  and  graphical  elements  in addi-
tion to the use  of linguistic expressions.  So  for the time  being it looks 
like a  good  strategy to combine  a  theoretical interest with  detailed explora-
tion of particular types of discourse. 
A particular type of theory  usually  also  favours  a  particular methodo-
logy.  This  is true for the dialogical  approach  which  calls for  a  more  dia-
logical methodology  than  what  is customary  in traditional psychological  ex-
periments.  Without  going  into technical detail one  can  trace back  the  basic 
methodological  decisions in this field to the  quest  ion  of which  are reliable 
criteria of understanding  and  which  are reliable indicators of comprehension 
problems.  In  everyday  communication  the fundamental  criterion of understan-
ding  is a  communicative  one.  If B is able to  produce  a  relevant reaction to 
A'S  utterance A will generally accept that B understood  A'S  utterance the  way 
she  meant  it. This  is a  truly dialogical criterion,  as  A is in the  same 
situation as  B,  i.e. the situation of having  to  understand  what  the other 
participant meant  by  her utterance.  There  is not  way  out of this hermeutical 
predicament.  What  is interesting from  the  point of view  of experimental 
methodology  is that the  spectrum  of reactions that could  count  as  relevant 
reactions is vast.  Types  of relevant reactions include:  answering  a  question, 
following  a  directive,  questioning apresupposition,  contradicting a  state-
ment,  correcting  a  description,  asking if a  given  paraphrase is correct, 
asking if the  preceding  discourse really was  about  such  and  such  a  topic, 
continuing  a  narrative at a  certain  point etc.  It is remarkable  that tradi-
tional  psychological  methods  relied on  a  very  small  inventory  of criteria, 
mainly  recall  (free recall and  cued  recall).  As  for  the indicators of  compre-
hension  problems  similar things  can  be  said.  Types  of relevant reactions 
include:  giving  an  answer  to a  question that was  not  asked,  not  following 
the  directlve,  following  a  directive that was  not  given,  hesitating in follo-
wing  the directive,  asking  for  clarification,  asking  for repetition,  complai-
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read  aloud  a  difficult passage,  going  back  to  a  passage  where  a  related topic 
was  dealt with etc.  Again  the traditional inventory  of indicators comprises  a 
relatively small selection,  including  reading  times,  reaction times  and  eye 
movements.  Inrecent times the traditional behavioral  experiments  for the 
measurement  of comprehensibility  seem  to  have  lost some  of their attraction 
even  within the community  of psychologists.  Experiments  that collect reading 
times,  recall protocols,  eye  movements  and  reaction tim  es  are  not  considered 
"sufficiently rich  and  distinctive for  discovering the  complex  symbolic  mecha-
nisms  and  representations that are  involved"  (GraesserjRobertsonjClark 1983, 
62).  However,  other methods,  like question-answering,  reading  aloud  and  thinking 
aloud,  are still considered rather "soft"  methods  the reliability and  validity 
of which  is doubtful.  It is however  conceded  that these methods  are  heuristi-
cally  valuable.  It looks  as if at the  present stage of comprehensibility re-
search the  generation of interesting  hypotheses  is such  an  important  desidera-
tum  that heuristic methods  are  ca lIed for,  even  if they  do  not  stand  up  to 
classical standards of psychological research.  Without  belittling the methodo-
logical  problems  involved one  could  generally  advocate  a  shift of interest 
from  statistical sophistication to interpretive finesse.  The  main  problems  of 
dialogical methods  seem  to lie in two  characteristics which  one  has  to  come 
to terms with:  In the first place,  spontaneous  reactions of the subjects  are 
not  easily standardized.  Secondly,  using  a  rich inventory of criteria and  indi-
cators forces  the  experimenters to a  rather time-consuming  amount  of interpre-
tive work.  Both  objections should  not  be  made  light of.  But  one  would  hope  that 
what  dialogical experiments  lose in classical elegance they  gain  in ecological 
validity. 
4.2  An  exploratory  experiment 
In order to give these reflections some  more  vividness,  I  shall  now  present  a 
few  preliminary remarks  on  a  small-scale exploratory experiment  we  did  in Tübin-
gen  in April 1990.9)  The  primary  aim  of the  experiment  was  to get empirical data 
concerning  comprehension  problems  which  we  expected  beginners to  have  with  the 
introductory  passages  of an  experimental  software manual.  We  had  formed  these 
expectations  on  the basis of  a  close analysis of these  passages  and  on  the 
basis of an  earlier pre-test with  different versions of such  passages.  The  test 
setting was  as  folIows: 
The  subject is seated at the  computer  with the manual  placed  next to the 
keybord.  The  subject is told to read  aloud  the manual  text and  to follow  the 
instructions given.  She  is also told to  VOlce  any  comments  that  come  to  her mi nd 19 
concerning  the text or her  own  execution  of the instructions.  Next  to the sub-
ject the  experimenter takes  place.  He  has  a  double  function.  He  may  be  asked  by 
the subject to help  her with  any  problem  that  comes  up  in the  course of the  pro-
cedure.  And  he  himself has  a  prepared list of questions,  formulated  on  the  basis 
of  the  prior analysis,  which  he  can  ask  if he  feels  that the subject  has  pro-
blems  she  herself does  not  notice or does  not  consider worth  mentioning. 
The  whole  procedure is recorded  on  videotape with  two  video  cameras  in order to 
get  a  good  view  of the screen  and  keyboard  as weIl  as  the subject and  the  ex-
perimenter. 
The  design  of the experiment  yields  a  rich combination  of criteria of under-
standing  and  indicators of comprehension  problems.  In the first place,  we  have 
the  external criterion of success  in the manipulation  of the  computer.  There  are 
also other criteria of successful  understanding,  e.g.  correct commentaries  on 
wh at was  to be  achieved  by  a  certain passage.  Secondly,  we  find  behavioral indi-
cators like direction ofgaze,  hesitation,  slowing  down  in reading  speed  etc. 
Thirdly,  we  find  problem-solving strategies like  re-reading  passages,  jumping 
back  and  forth  between  the  passage  under  work  and  earlier paragraphs,  checking 
and  re-checking  the relation between  graphics in the  manual  and  wh at is on  the 
screen.  A fourth  group  are  communicative  indicators like rising intonation to 
convey  doubt,  calls for  help  and  statements  as to the  problems  the subject 
encounters.  Finally,  we  have  the answers  to the experimenter's  questions, 
which  provide  information  as to  unexpected  understandings,  misunderstandings 
and  lack  of knowledge  at certain  points in the  procedure.  Of  course the  richness 
of indicators  may  be  considered  a  mixed  blessing if one  thinks  in terms  of  ex-
perimental  economy.  But  economy  was  at this point  no  high-ranking  demand. 
This little experiment is fairly  unsophisticated in several respects  and  it 
would  surely meet  with  many  objections from  experimental  psychologists.  But  as 
a  heuristic device it turned out to  be  highly  useful.  In  many  cases indicators 
consistently pointed towards  the  problems  we  had  predicted on  the  basis of our 
analysis.  Apart  from  confirming  a  number  of hypotheses  the  experiment  contribu-
ted to the  development  of a  more  specific typology  of comprehension  problems 
for the  users  of this particular text.  These  were  mainly  difficulties related 
to the types of problems  mentioned  earlier in this paper,  e.g.  unfamiliar ter-
minology  that was  not  properly  introduced,  inconsistent nomenclature,  awkward 
syntactic structures  (complex  and  ambiguous  sentences) ,  problems  of reference 
and  of unsatisfactory sequential organization,  problems  with  the  function  of 
individual  sentences,  passages,  and  graphics,  problems  with the relations bet-
ween  text and  graphics etc.  On  the other hand  quite  a  number  of difficulties 20 
arose which  we  had  not  anticipated and  which  could  in part be  put  down  to 
particular reading  strategies we  had  not  expected.  In general,  we  found  it re-
markable  how  patient the subjects dealt with  fairly bad  passages.  They  mostly 
adopted  a  wait-and-see strategy and  applied the  principle of charity.  This  was 
also  an  interesting result. 
In  concluding this  paper  I  should  like to draw  attention to  a  difficulty 
which  is inherent in  any  kind  of empirical  experiment  in this field  but which 
becomes  magnified  with the richness of indicators available in our case.  It is 
one  thing to  note  a  certain utterance or action  as  an  indicator of trouble  but 
quite  another to attribute the trouble with  sufficient confidence to one  parti-
cular factor or a  particular set of factors.  This  difficulty is less grave if 
one  is mainly  interested in practical matters,  i.e.  in the  improvement  of the 
manual  in question.  In this case the location of an  area  of trouble  usually 
suffices to suggest  improvements.  If however  one  is interested in correlating 
indicators with  types  of problems  in a  principled  way  things  become  much  more 
complicated.  This  is mainly  due  to two  facts:  First of all,  in  many  cases dif-
ferent  potential factors  are  simultaneously  present,  e.g.  an  unfamiliar meta-
phorical  use  of an  expression  and  lack of relevant  knowledge,  which  poses  the 
analytical task of filtering out which  individual factor or which  interplay of 
factors  actually caused  the trouble.  Ideally one  would  have  to  vary  textual 
characteristics and  knowledge  structures in such  a  fashion  as to allow one  to 
isolate individual factors  or the relevant cluster of factors.  Secondly,  parti-
cular indicators,  like hesitation,  re-reading etc.,  may  point to different 
factors,  e.g.  a  difficult syntactic construction or an  unclear relation between 
text and  graphic.  In the latter case  we  would  expect eye  movement  to give  a 
furt  her  hint.  But  in many  cases there are  no  obvious  differentiating indicators 
available.  Some  of the indicators  are  more  specific than  others.  Explicit com-
plaints or questions  are  highest in the scale of direct indication.  But  even 
so,  complaints are  no  analyses.  If a  subject complains  that after reading  a 
sentence  she  does  not  know  whether  she is now  expected  to  do  something  or 
whether  the machine  will  now  "do"  something,  this complaint  does  not  show 
whether  the real  problem  lies in the fact that  by  using  a  sentence in the pas-
sive  voice  the author does  not  specify the  agent of the relevant activity or 
in the fact that the  author  has  done  nothing  to clarify the  nature of the acti-
vity  in the  previous text or in the  combination  of facts.  This,  by  the way,  is 
one  of the reasons  why  expert ratings are  no  substitute for  principled analysis. 
A rating like "confusing"  does  nothing to pinpoint the relevant factors.  An 
indicator like the subject's turning  back  the  pages  in the text is a  fairly good \ . 
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indicator that the  subject lacks  a  particular bit of information which  she  be-
lieves was  presented at an  earlier point in the instruction.  But  it is the  kind 
of indicator where  one  might  want  to actually ask  the subject what  it is she is 
looking  for.  It takes  an  attentive experimenter  not to miss  such  opportunities 
for clarification. It looks  as if hesitation,  slowing  down  etc.  were  the least 
specific indicators which  do  in general  not  yield more  than  unspecific  evidence 
of trouble.  This  is the  point where  a  detailed analysis of the  context of the 
trouble  has  to set in. 
In  sum,  the  experiment  contains two  levels of detailed analysis,  which  could 
be  explained  as  concerning  two  moves  of a  dialogue  game.  The  first analysis  con-
cerns the structure of the text which  is intended to  be  used  as  a  first move  (or 
sequence  of moves)  in the instruction game.  This  analysis  aims  at generating  hy-
potheses  as to  problems  of comprehension  which  are related to types of factors 
and  clusters of factors  provided  by  dialogue  theory.  The  second  analysis  concerns 
the reactions of the  subjects,  i.e. the  second  moves  in the instruction game. 
Again  the  focus  of analysis is provided  by  the theoretical framework.  The  second 
analysis  concentrates  on  potential indicators,  their context and  their relations 
with  comprehension  factors.  If this looks  like a  rat  her  complicated set of inter-
pretive procedures,  the  complications are germane  to the subject. 
In winding  up  this  paper  I  should like to  give  a  short programmatic  summary. 
The  dialogical  (or interactionist)  approach  presented in this paper emphasizes 
aspects that have  so  far  been  underrated,  e.g.  recipient design  of utterances, 
patterns of functional  sequencing  and  strategic sequencing  alternatives.  It pro-
videstools for dialogical experimental  design  and  a  fine-grained  and  context-
sensitive analysis of dialogues  and  their monological  counterparts,  which  inclu-
des  a  sophisticated interpretive methodology  for  experimental  data.  It would 
seem  that serious theorizing  on  internal cognitive  processes would  have  to  be 
based  on  a  detailed analysis of what  the  processing models  are  supposed  to ex-
plain.  Therefore  an  emphasis  on  detailed analysis Gf  dialogical action will  no 
doubt  make  sense to cognitivists as weIl.  On  the other  hand,  pending  the clari-
fication  of some  of the  conceptual matters mentioned  in section 2.3,  an  agnostic 
attitude as to the  assumptions  of particular processing models  could  be  con-
sidered a  consistent attitude for  an  interactionist. 22 
Notes 
1)  Grice's remarks  are  a  distinct echo  of a  precept of classical rhetoric, 
i.e. that our  prime  virtue  in  speech  should  be  perspicuity. 
2)  The  concept  of recipient design  goes  back  to Sacks/Schegloff/Jefferson 
(1974) . 
3)  On  the analysis of dialogue  dynamics  and  the  history of dialogue  cf. 
Fritz  (1989). 
4)  The  Hamburg  conception is presented in Langer/Schulz  v.  Thun/Tausch  (1981). 
A critical assessment  of the  Hamburg  conception  and  of readability formulas 
can  be  found  in  Ballstaedt/Mandl  (1988).  A critical attitude do  readability 
formulas  is also the general tendency  in the  papers  collected in Davison/ 
Green  (1988). 
5)  Space  does  not  permit  a  detailed analysis of the  concepts  in question. 
Fritz  (1991)  contains  some  further reflections  on  the  concepts  of plan  and 
of understanding.  Suchman  (1987)  contains  a  very  insightful discussion of 
the  basic  assumptions  of interactionalists and  cognitivists.  Cf.  also Biere 
(1989) . 
6)  Cf.  Wittgenstein  (1969),  §§  347ff. 
7)  A useful  book  on  syntax  and  comprehension  is Heringer  (1988),  a  "receptive 
grammar"  of German. 
8)  The  emphasis  on  the  propositional aspect often goes  hand  in hand  not  only 
with  the  neglect of the  illocutionary aspect  but  also with  a  disregard for 
the syntactic form  of utterances.  Both  shortcomings  are  evident in van  Dijk/ 
Kintsch  (1983),  in spite of avowals  to the contrary. 
9)  A detailed report  on  this experiment will be  given  in  Schäflein-Armbruster 
(forthcoming) . 
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